Previous work shows that adversarially robust generalization requires larger sample complexity, and the same dataset, e.g., CIFAR-10, which enables good standard accuracy may not suffice to train robust models. Since collecting new training data could be costly, we instead focus on inducing locally dense sample distribution, i.e., high sample density in the feature space which could lead to locally sufficient samples for robust learning. We first formally show that the softmax cross-entropy (SCE) loss and its variants induce inappropriate sample density distributions in the feature space, which inspires us to design appropriate training objectives. Specifically, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss to create highdensity regions for better robustness. It encourages the learned features to gather around the preset class centers with optimal inter-class dispersion. Comparing to the SCE loss and its variants, we empirically demonstrate that applying the MMC loss can significantly improve robustness even under strong adaptive attacks, while keeping state-of-the-art accuracy on clean inputs with little extra computation.
Introduction
The deep neural networks (DNNs) trained by the softmax cross-entropy (SCE) loss have achieved state-of-the-art performance on various tasks [17] . However, in terms of robustness, the SCE loss is not sufficient to lead to satisfactory performance of the trained models. It has been widely recognized that the DNNs trained by the SCE loss are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [3, 18, 31, 36, 37, 43] , where human imperceptible perturbations can be crafted to fool a high-performance network.
To improve adversarial robustness of classifiers, various kinds of defenses have been proposed, but many of them are quickly shown to be ineffective to the adaptive attacks, which are adapted to the specific details of the proposed defenses [1, 4, 51] . Besides, other methods on verification and training provably robust networks have also been proposed [10, 11, 22, 55, 56] . While these methods are exciting, the verification process is often slow and not scalable. Thus many recent efforts have been devoted to proposing faster verification methods [57, 58] . Among the previously proposed defenses, the adversarial training (AT) methods can achieve state-of-the-art robustness under different adversarial settings [28, 36, 59, 60] . These methods either directly impose the AT mechanism on the SCE loss or add additional regularizers. Although the AT methods are relatively strong, they are computationally expensive and could sacrifice accuracy on clean inputs [36, 60] .
Schmidt et al. [46] show that the sample complexity of robust learning can be significantly larger than that of standard learning. Given the difficulty of training robust classifiers in practice, they further postulate that the difficulty could stem from the insufficiency of training samples in the commonly used datasets, e.g., CIFAR-10 [30] . However, collecting new suitable training data could be costly or even impractical, thus we focus on utilizing the data samples in hand more efficiently. Note that although the samples in the input space are unchangeable, we could instead manipulate the ∈ , + ∆ (low sample density) ∈ , + ∆ (high sample density)
, * ∈ , + ∆ (medium sample density) ∈ , + ∆ (medium sample density)
SCE MMC

Learned features of training data with label
Prefixed feature center of label in ℒ223 Contours of the objective loss ( 5 > 7, ∆ is a small value)
Moving directions of learned features during training Similar to our attempt to induce highdensity regions in the feature space, previous work has been proposed to improve intra-class compactness.
Contrastive loss [19, 49] and triplet loss [47] are two classical objectives for this purpose, but the training iterations will dramatically grow to construct image pairs or triplets, which results in slow convergence and instability. The more recently proposed center loss [54] avoids the pair-wise or triplet-wise computation by minimizing the squared distance between the features and the corresponding class centers. However, since the class centers are updated w.r.t. the learned features during training, the center loss has to be jointly used with the SCE loss to seek for a trade-off between inter-class dispersion and intra-class compactness [54] . Therefore, the center loss cannot concentrate on inducing strong intra-class compactness to construct high-density regions and consequently could not lead to reliable robustness, as shown in our experiments. Furthermore, in Sec. 3, we formally analyze the sample density distribution induced by the SCE loss and its other variants [41, 53] , which demonstrates that these previously proposed objectives are also insufficient to produce high-density regions in the feature space as we want.
In this paper, we propose a novel training objective which can explicitly induce high-density regions in the feature space. To achieve this, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss (detailed in Eq. (9)) as the substitute of the SCE loss. Specifically, in the MMC loss, we first preset untrainable class centers with optimal inter-class dispersion in the feature space according to Pang et al. [41] , then we encourage the features to gather around the centers by minimizing the squared distance similar with the center loss. The MMC loss can explicitly control the inter-class dispersion by a single hyperparameter, and further concentrate on improving intra-class compactness in the training procedure to induce high-density regions, as intuitively shown in Fig. 1 . Behind the simple formula, the MMC loss elegantly combines the favorable merits of the previous methods, which leads to a considerable improvement on the adversarial robustness.
In experiments, we follow the suggestion by Carlini et al. [5] that we test under different threat models and attacks, including the adaptive attacks [4, 23] on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 [30, 33] . The results demonstrate that our method can lead to reliable robustness of the trained models with little extra computation, while maintaining state-of-the-art clean accuracy with faster convergence rates compared to the SCE loss and its variants. When combined with the existing defense mechanisms, e.g., the AT methods [36] , the trained models can be further enhanced under unseen attacks, i.e., the attacks different from the one used to craft adversarial examples for training.
Preliminaries
This section first provides the notations, then introduces the adversarial attacks and threat models.
Notations
In this paper, we use the lowercases to denote variables and the uppercases to denote mappings. Let L be the number of classes, we define the softmax function
, where [L] := {1, · · · , L} and h is termed as logit. A deep neural network (DNN) learns a non-linear mapping from the input x ∈ R p to the feature z = Z(x) ∈ R d . One common training objective for DNNs is the softmax cross-entropy (SCE) loss defined as:
for a single input-label pair (x, y), where 1 y is the one-hot encoding of y and the logarithm is defined as element-wise. Here W and b are the weight matrix and bias vector of the SCE loss, respectively.
Adversarial attacks and threat models
Previous work has shown that adversarial examples can be easily crafted to fool DNNs [2, 39, 50] . A large amount of attacking methods on generating adversarial examples have been introduced in recent years [1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 18, 24, 31, 36, 37, 43, 52] . Given the space limit, we try to perform a comprehensive evaluation by considering five different threat models and choosing representative attacks for each threat model following the suggestion by Carlini et al. [5] :
White-box l ∞ distortion attack: We apply the projected gradient descent (PGD) [36] method, which is efficient and widely studied in previous work [28, 42, 59] .
White-box l 2 distortion attack: We apply the C&W [3] method, which has a binary search mechanism on its parameters to find the minimal l 2 distortion for a successful attack.
Black-box transfer-based attack: We use the momentum iterative method (MIM) [9] that is effective on boosting adversarial transferability and won the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Competition [32] .
Black-box gradient-free attack: We choose SPSA [52] since it has broken many previously proposed defenses. It can still perform well even when the loss surface is difficult to optimize over.
General-purpose attack: To demonstrate that our method is generally robust, we also test the model performance when adding Gaussian noise [13, 16] or random rotation [12] on the input images.
Furthermore, to exclude the false robustness caused by, e.g., gradient mask [1] , we modify the above attacking methods to be adaptive attacks [4, 5, 23] when evaluating on the robustness of our method. The adaptive attacks are much more powerful than the non-adaptive ones, as detailed in Sec. 4.2.
Methodology
Various theoretical explanations have been developed for adversarial examples [13, 14, 25, 44, 46] . In particular, Schmidt et al. [46] show that training robust classifiers requires significantly larger sample complexity compared to that of training standard ones, and they further postulate that the difficulty of training robust classifiers stems from, at least partly, the insufficiency of training samples in the commonly used datasets. Since collecting extra training data is often non-trivial and could be costly in many cases, it is wise to better explore the given data samples for robust learning. Although a given sample is fixed in the input space, we can instead manipulate the local sample distribution, i.e., sample density in the feature space, via designing appropriate training objectives. Intuitively, by inducing high-density regions in the feature space, it can be expected to have locally sufficient samples to train robust models that are able to return reliable predictions. In this section, we first formally define the notion of sample density in the feature space. Then we provide theoretical analyses of the sample density induced by the SCE loss and its variants. Finally, we propose our new Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss and demonstrate its superiority compared to previous losses.
Sample density in the feature space
Given a training dataset D with N input-label pairs, and the feature mapping Z trained by the objective L(Z(x), y) on this dataset, we define the sample density nearby the feature point z = Z(x) following the similar definition in physics [27] as
Here Vol(·) denotes the volume of the input set, ∆B is a small neighbourhood containing the feature point z, and ∆N = |Z(D) ∩ ∆B| is the number of training points in ∆B, where Z(D) is the set of all mapped features for the inputs in D. In the training procedure, the feature distribution is directly induced by the training loss L, where minimizing the loss value is the only supervisory signal for the feature points to move [17] . This means that the sample density varies mainly along the orthogonal direction w.r.t. the loss contours, while the density along a certain contour could be approximately considered as the same. For example, in the right panel of Fig. 1 , the sample density induced by our MMC loss (detailed in Sec. 3.3) changes mainly along the radial direction, where the loss contours are concentric circles. Therefore, supposing L(Z(x), y) = C, we choose
where ∆C > 0 is a small value. Then Vol(∆B) is the volume between the loss contours of C and C + ∆C for label y in the feature space.
The sample density induced by the generalized SCE loss
To better understand how the SCE loss and its variants [41, 53] affect the sample density in the feature space, we first generalize the definition in Eq. (1) as:
where the logit h = H(z) ∈ R L is a general transformation of the feature z, for example, h = W z +b in the SCE loss. We call this family of losses as the generalized SCE (g-SCE) loss. Wan et al. [53] propose the large-margin Gaussian Mixture (L-GM) loss, where
under the assumption that the learned features z distribute as a mixture of Gaussian. Here µ i and Σ i are extra trainable means and covariance matrices respectively, m is the margin, and δ i,y is the indicator function. Pang et al. [41] propose the Max-Mahalanobis linear discriminant analysis (MMLDA) loss, where
under the similar mixture of Gaussian assumption, but the main difference is that µ * i are not trainable, but calculated before training with optimal inter-class dispersion. These two losses both fall into the family of the g-SCE loss with quadratic logits:
where B i are the bias variables. Besides, note that for the SCE loss, there is
. (5) According to Eq. (4), the SCE loss can also be regraded as a special case of the g-SCE loss with quadratic logits, where
and Σ i = I are identity matrices. Therefore, later when we refer to the g-SCE loss, we assume that the logits are quadratic as in Eq. (4) by default.
To provide a formal representation of the sample density induced by the g-SCE loss, we first derive the formula of the contours, i.e., the closed-form solution of L g-SCE (Z(x), y) = C in the space of z, where C ∈ (0, +∞) is a given constant. Let C e = exp(C) ∈ (1, +∞), from Eq. (3), we have:
The function in Eq. (6) does not provide an intuitive closed-form solution for the contours, since the existence of the term log l =y exp(h l ) . However, note that this term belongs to the family of Log-Sum-Exp (LSE) function, which is a smooth approximation to the maximum function [38, 40] . Therefore, we can locally approximate the function in Eq. (6) with the equation:
as the local approximation of the g-SCE loss nearby the feature point z, and substitute the neighborhood ∆B by
For simplicity, we assume scaled identity covariance matrix in Eq. (4), i.e., Σ i = σ i I, where σ i > 0 are scalars. Through simple derivations (detailed in Appendix A.1), we show that if σ y = σŷ, the solution of L y,ŷ (z) = C is a (d−1)-dimensional hypersphere with the center M y,ŷ = (σ y −σŷ) −1 (σ y µ y −σŷµŷ); otherwise, the hypersphere-shape contour will degenerate to a hyperplane. Since the approximation in Eq. (7) depends on the specific y andŷ, we denote the subset
includes the data with the true label of class k, while the highest prediction returned by the classifier is classk among other classes. In the training process, let
, y) be the averaged g-SCE loss in the subset D k,k . Then we can derive the approximated sample density in the feature space induced by the g-SCE loss, as stated in the following theorem:
and L g-SCE (z, y) = C, if there are Σ k = σ k I, Σk = σkI, and σ k = σk, then the sample density based on the approximation in Eq. (7) is
, where
and ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution.
Remark 1.
If σ k = σk (e.g., as in the SCE loss), the features with loss values in [C, C + ∆C] will be encouraged to locate between two hyperplane contours without further supervision, and consequently there will not be explicit supervision on the sample density as shown in the left panel of Fig. 1 .
Remark 2. Based on the conclusion in Theorem 1, we find that there are some inherent limitations of the g-SCE loss. Under the approximation in Eq. (7), let C * = log(1 + exp(B k,k (σk − σ k ))) and
will act as a tight lower bound for C, i.e., the solution set of C < C * is empty. This will make the training procedure tend to avoid this case since the loss C cannot be further minimized to zero, which will introduce unnecessary biases on the returned predictions. On the other hand, if σ k < σk, C could be minimized to zero. However, when C → 0, the sample density will also tend to zero since there is
→ ∞, which means the feature point will be encouraged to go further and further from the hypersphere center M k,k only to make the loss value C be lower. This is counter-intuitive since the points with low loss values have to sparsely spread over the space. In practice, the feature point will not move to infinity, since the existence of batch normalization (BN) layers [26] , and the squared radius from the center M k,k increases as O(| log C|) when minimizing the loss C. These theoretical conclusions are consistent with the empirical observations on the two-dimensional features in previous work [34, 53, 54] . Another limitation of the g-SCE loss is that the sample density is proportional to N k,k , which is on average N/L 2 . For example, there are around 1.3 million training data in ImageNet [8] , but with a large number of classes L = 1, 000, there are averagely less than two samples in each D k,k . These limitations inspire us to design the new training loss as in Sec 3.3.
Remark 3. Except for the g-SCE loss, Wen et al. [54] propose the center loss in order to improve the intra-class compactness of learned features, formulated as L Center (Z(x), y) =
Here the center µ y is updated based on a mini-batch of learned features with label y in each training iteration. The center loss has to be jointly used with the SCE loss as L SCE + λL Center , since simply supervise the DNNs with the center loss will cause the learned features and centers to degrade to zeros [54] . This makes it difficult to derive a closed-form formula for the induced sample density. Furthermore, the center loss method cannot concentrate on improving intra-class compactness, since it has to seek for a trade-off between inter-class dispersion and intra-class compactness.
Max-Mahalanobis center loss
The limitation of the g-SCE loss, e.g., the MMLDA loss (detailed in Remark 4) mainly roots from the softmax function, which makes the loss value only depend on the relative relation among logits. This will cause unexpected and unstable supervisory signals on the learned features, as shown in Sec. 3.2. One way to solve the limitations is to impose more direct and stronger supervision on the features. Inspired by the above analyses, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss as
Here
are the centers of the Max-Mahalanobis distribution (MMD) [41] . The MMD is a mixture of Gaussian distribution with identity covariance matrix and preset centers µ * , where
, and C MM is a hyperparameter. These MMD centers are invariable during training, which are crafted according to the criterion: µ * = arg min µ max i =j µ i , µ j . Intuitively, this criterion is to maximize the minimal angle between any two centers, which can provide optimal inter-class dispersion as shown in [41] . Behind the simple formula, the MMC loss can explicitly monitor inter-class dispersion by the hyperparameter C MM , while enabling the network to concentrate on minimizing intra-class compactness in training to produce high-density regions around the centers µ * , as shown in the right panel of Fig. 1 . To formally demonstrate this property, we derive the sample density in the feature space induced by the MMC loss, as stated below:
and L MMC (z, y) = C, the sample density is
where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution.
Similar to the previously introduced notations, here we denote the subset D k = {(x, y) ∈ D|y = k} and N k = |D k |. In the training process, we let
, y) be the averaged MMC loss in the subset D k . According to Theorem 2, there are attractive merits of the MMC loss compared to the g-SCE loss. First, the sample density here is proportional to N k rather than N k,k , where N k is on average N/L. It facilitates producing larger sample density. Second, when the loss value C is minimized to zero, the sample density will exponentially increase according to Eq. (10). The right panel of Fig. 1 provides an intuitive insight on this property of the MMC loss: Since the loss value C is proportional to the squared distance from the preset center µ * y , the feature points with lower loss values are certain to locate in a smaller volume around the center. Consequently, the feature points of the same class are encouraged to gather around the corresponding center, such that for each sample, there will be more other samples in its neighborhood, which leads to locally robust predictions [46] . Therefore, the MMC loss value becomes a reliable metric of the uncertainty on returned predictions. Besides, the MMC loss can naturally avoid the degradation problem encountered in the center loss, since the preset centers µ * are untrainable. These properties of the MMC loss lead to a considerable improvement on robustness and faster convergence rate in the training procedure compared to the other losses, as shown in our experiments. In the test phase, the network can still return a normalized prediction with the softmax function. In Appendix B.1, we provide the generation algorithm for µ * . In Appendix B.2, we discuss on why the squared-error form in Eq. (9) is preferred compared to, e.g., the absolute form or the Huber form [15] in the adversarial setting. We further introduce flexible variants of the MMC loss in Appendix B.3, which can better adapt to various tasks.
Remark 4. Pang et al. [41] propose a Max-Mahalanobis linear discriminant analysis (MMLDA) method, which assume the features to distribute as a MMD. Due to the Gaussian mixture assumption, the training loss for the MMLDA method is obtained by the Bayes' theorem as
. (11) Note that there is Σ i = 1 2 I in Eq. (4) for the MMLDA loss, similar with the SCE loss. Thus the MMLDA method cannot explicitly supervise on the sample density and induce high-density regions in the feature space, as analyzed in Sec. 3.2. Compared to the MMLDA method, the MMC loss introduces extra supervision on intra-class compactness, which facilitates better robustness.
Experiments
In this section, we empirically demonstrate several attractive merits of applying the MMC loss. We experiment on the widely used MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets [30, 33] . Since the existing defenses can already provide satisfactory robustness on MNIST [36, 45, 48, 56] , we mainly demonstrate the results on CIFAR-10 in our experiments. The results on CIFAR-100 are detailed in Appendix C. The code for implementing our experiments is provided in the supplementary material.
Performance on the clean inputs
The network architecture applied is ResNet-47 [21] with five core layer blocks. Here we use MMC-10 to indicate the MMC loss with C MM = 10, where C MM is assigned based on the cross-validation results in [41] . The hyperparameters for the center loss, L-GM loss and the MMLDA method all follow the settings in the original papers [41, 53, 54] . The pixel values are scaled to the interval [0, 1]. For each training loss with or without the AT mechanism, we apply the Adam [29] optimizer with the initial learning rate of 0.001, and train for 40 epochs on MNIST, 180 epochs on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. When applying the AT mechanism [36] , the adversarial examples for training are crafted by 10-steps targeted or untargeted PGD with = 8/255. In Fig 2 (a) , we provide the curves of the test error rate w.r.t. the training time. Note that the MMC loss induces faster convergence rate and requires little extra computation compared to the SCE loss and its variants, while keeping state-of-the-art performance on the clean images. In comparison, implementing the AT mechanism is computationally expensive in training and will largely sacrifice the accuracy on the clean images.
Adaptive attacks for the MMC loss
As stated in [5] , only applying the existing attacks with default hyperparameters is not sufficient to claim reliable robustness. Thus, we apply the adaptive versions of existing attacks when evading the networks trained by the MMC loss (detailed in Appendix B.4). For instance, the non-adaptive objectives for PGD are variants of the SCE loss [36] , while the adaptive objectives are −L MMC (z, y) and L MMC (z, y t ) in the untargeted and targeted modes for PGD, respectively. Here y t is the target label. To verify that the adaptive attacks are more effective than the non-adaptive ones, we modify the network architecture with a two-dimensional feature layer and visualize the PGD attacking procedure in Fig 2 (b) . The two panels separately correspond to two randomly selected clean inputs. The 10 clusters in each panel consist of the features of all the 10,000 test samples in MNIST, where each color corresponds to one class. We can see that the adaptive attacks are indeed much more efficient.
Performance under the white-box attacks
We first investigate the white-box l ∞ distortion setting using the PGD attack, and report the results in Table 1 . According to [5] , we evaluate under different combinations of the attacking parameters: the perturbation , iteration steps, and the attack mode, i.e., targeted or untargeted. Following the setting in [36] , we choose the perturbation = 8/255 and 16/255, with the step size be 2/255. From the results in Table 1 , the MMC loss can significantly improve robustness even under the adaptive attacks. When combining with the AT mechanism, the trained models have better performance under unseen attacks, i.e., the attacks different from the one used to craft adversarial examples for training. Then we investigate the white-box l 2 distortion setting. We apply the C&W attack, where it has a binary search mechanism to find the minimal distortion to successfully mislead the classifier under the untargeted mode, or successfully lead the classifier to predict the target label in the targeted mode. Following the suggestion in [3] , we set the binary search steps to be 9 with the initial constant c = 0.01. The iteration steps for each value of c are set to be 1,000 with the learning rate of 0.005. In the Part I of Table 2 , we report the minimal distortions found by the C&W attack. As expected, it requires much larger distortions to successfully evade the networks trained by the MMC loss.
Performance under the black-box attacks
As suggested in [1] , providing evidence of being robust against the black-box attacks is critical to claim reliable robustness. We first perform the transfer-based attacks using PGD and MIM. Since the targeted attacks usually have poor transferability [32] , we only focus on the untargeted mode in this case, and the results are shown in Fig. 3 . We further perform the gradient-free attacks using the SPSA method and report the results in the Part II of Table 2 . To perform numerical approximations on gradients in SPSA, we set the batch size to be 128, the learning rate is 0.01 and the step size of finite difference is δ = 0.01, as suggested by [52] . These results indicate that training with the MMC loss also leads to robustness under the black-box attacks, which verifies that our method can induce reliable robustness, rather than the false one caused by, e.g., gradient mask [1] .
Performance under the general-purpose attacks
To show that our method is generally robust, we further test under the general-purpose attacks [5] . We apply the Gaussian noise [13, 16] and rotation transformation [12] , which are not included in the data augmentation for training. The results are given in the Part III of Table 2 . Note that the AT methods are less robust to simple transformations like rotation, as also observed in previous work [12] . In comparison, the models trained by the MMC loss are still robust to these easy-to-apply attacks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the MMC loss to induce high-density regions in the feature space, and empirically demonstrate several favorable merits of our method: (i) Lead to reliable robustness even under strong adaptive attacks; (ii) Keep state-of-the-art performance on clean inputs; (iii) Introduce little extra computation; (iv) Compatible with the existing defense mechanisms, e.g., the AT methods.
A Proof
In this section, we provide the proof of the theorems proposed in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
According to the definition of sample density
we separately calculate ∆N and Vol(∆B). Since
) for the data points in
where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution. Now we calculate Vol(∆B) by approximating it with Vol(∆B y,ŷ ). We first derive the solution of L y,ŷ = C. For simplicity, we assume scaled identity covariance matrix, i.e., Σ i = σ i I, where σ i > 0 are scalars.
hypersphere embedded in the d-dimensional space of the feature z:
Note that each value of c corresponds to a specific contour, where M i,j and B i,j can be regraded as constant w.r.t. c. When B i,j < (σ i − σ j ) −1 c, the solution set becomes empty. Specially, if σ i = σ j = σ, the hypersphere-shape contour will degenerate to a hyperplane:
For example, for the SCE loss, the solution of the contour is z (W i − W j ) = b j − b i + c. For more general Σ i , the conclusions are similar, e.g., the solution in Eq. (13) will become a hyperellipse. Now it easy to show that the solution of L y,ŷ = C when y = k,ŷ =k is the hypersphere:
According to the formula of the hypersphere surface area [35] , the volume of ∆B y,ŷ is Vol(∆B y,ŷ ) = 2π
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. Finally we can approximate the sample density as
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, there is
where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution. Unlike for the g-SCE, we can exactly calculate Vol(∆B) for the MMC loss. Note that the solution of L MMC = C is the hypersphere:
According to the formula of the hypersphere surface area [35] , we have
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. Finally we can obtain the sample density as
B Technical details
In this section, we provide more technical details we applied in our paper.
B.1 Generation algorithm for the Max-Mahalanobis centers
We give the generation algorithm for crafting the Max-Mahalanobis Centers in Algorithm 1, proposed by Pang et al. [41] . Note that there are two minor differences from the originally proposed algorithm. First is that in [41] they use C = µ i 2 2 , while we use C MM = µ i 2 . Second is that we denote the feature z ∈ R d , while they denote z ∈ R p . The Max-Mahalanobis centers generated in the low-dimensional cases are quite intuitive and comprehensible. For examples, when L = 2, the Max-Mahalanobis centers are the two vertexes of a line segment; when L = 3, they are the three vertexes of an equilateral triangle; when L = 4, they are the four vertexes of a regular tetrahedron. 
Algorithm 1 GenerateMMcenters
R d . for i = 2 to L do for j = 1 to i − 1 do µ * i (j) = −[1 + µ * i , µ * j · (L − 1)]/[µ * j (j) · (L − 1)] end for µ * i (i) = 1 − µ * i 2 2 end for for k = 1 to L do µ * k = C MM · µ * k end for Return: The optimal mean vectors µ * i , i ∈ [L].
B.2 Why the squared-error form is preferred
In the feature space, penalizing the distance between the features and the prefixed centers can be regarded as a regression problem. In the MMC loss, we apply the squared-error form as z − µ * y 2 2 . Other substitutes could be the absolute form z − µ * y 2 or the Huber form. As stated in [15] , the absolute form and the Huber form are more resistant to the noisy data (outliers) or the misspecification of the class labels, especially in the data mining applications. However, in the classification tasks that we focus on in this paper, the training data is clean and reliable. Thus the squared-error form can lead to state-of-the-art accuracy with faster convergence rate compared to other forms. Furthermore, in the adversarial setting, the adversarial examples have similar properties as the outliers. When we apply the AT mechanism in the training procedure, we expect the classifiers to pay more attention to the adversarial examples, i.e., the outliers. Note that this goal is the opposite of it in the data mining applications, where outliers are intended to be ignored. Therefore, due to the sensitivity to the outliers, the squared-error form can better collaborate with the AT mechanism to improve robustness.
Besides, the MMC loss can naturally perform stronger AT mechanism without additional regularizer term. Specifically, let x be the clean input, x * be the adversarial example crafted based on x, then in the adversarial logit pairing (ALP) method [28] , there is an extra regularizer except for SCE as:
When adding x * as an extra training point for MMC, then the MMC loss will minimize z(x) − µ * y 2
, which is an upper bound for
. Thus performing naive adversarial training [18, 36] with MMC is equivalent to performing stronger adversarial training variants like ALP. As analyzed above, the squared-error form in the MMC loss can accelerate the convergence of the AT mechanism, since the objective is sensitive to the crafted adversarial examples.
B.3 Variants of the MMC loss
In the MMC loss, we encourage the features to gather around the preset Max-Mahalanobis (MM) centers µ
, which leads to many attractive properties. However, this 'hard' supervision, which induces quite an orderly feature distribution may beyond the reach of the model capability, especially when the classification tasks themselves are already challenging to learn, e.g., ImageNet [8] . Therefore, we propose potential variants of the MMC loss that could probably solve the problem and make our method more adaptable. We leave the experimental investigations as future work.
Note that the MMC loss can be regarded as minimizing the negative log likelihood (NLL) of − log(P (z|y)), where the conditional feature distribution is modeled as z|y ∼ N (µ * y , I). As described above, this distribution model may not be easy to learn by the DNNs in some cases. Thus, we construct a softer model: z|y, µ y ∼ N (µ y , I) and µ y ∼ N (µ * y , αI), where α > 0 is a scalar. Here we give the feature center µ y a prior distribution, while the prior is centered at µ * y . Intuitively, we relax the constraint that the features have to gather around µ * y . Instead, we encourage the features to gather around a substitute µ y , while µ y should be in the vicinity of µ * y . In the training, we minimize the joint NLL of − log(P (z, µ y |y)) = − log(P (z|y, µ y )) − log(P (µ y )), which is equivalent to minimize the what we call elastic Max-Mahalanobis center (EMC) loss as:
B.4 Adaptive objectives and the induced attacking mechanisms
We apply the adaptive versions of existing attacks when evading the networks trained by the MMC loss. We separately design two adaptive adversarial objectives L Ada to minimize under the untargeted mode: L Ada are used in the C&W attacks. In  Fig. 4 , we demonstrate the attacking mechanisms induced by different adaptive adversarial objectives. Note that we only focus on the gradients and ignore the specific method which implements the attack. Different adaptive objectives are preferred under different adversarial goals. For examples, when decreasing the confidence of the true label is the goal, L un,1
Ada is the optimal choice; in order to mislead the classifier to predict an untrue label or the target label, L 
C Experiments on CIFAR-100
In Table 3 , we provide the results on CIFAR-100 under the white-box PGD and C&W attacks, and the black-box gradient-free SPSA attack. Note that targeted PGD or SPSA may not able to fool the classifier to predict the target label. Compared to the results on CIFAR-10, the averaged distortion of C&W on CIFAR-100 is larger for a successful targeted attack and is much smaller for a successful untargeted attack. This is because when only the number of classes increases, e.g., from 10 to 100, it is easier to achieve a coarse untargeted attack, but harder to make a subtle targeted attack. 
